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Abstract 
I review private copying laws and practices in different jurisdictions, with a particular emphasis on 
the methodology followed in France to determine rightsholders’ compensation for the private copying 
of their copyrighted works in different repertoires namely audio, video, still pictures, and printed 
material. I discuss the economics of copyright compensation in the digital era and offer some 
comments on particularly important issues met in private copying.  
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Introduction 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Stichting de Thuiskopie, the 
Dutch collecting society for private copying, published a survey1 on private copying 
systems that provides a global overview on law, on the recent legal developments, and on 
practices regarding private copying compensations or levies: “The survey provides a 
global view of private copying compensation (also known as private copying levies), an 
important element of copyright and related rights infrastructure. It aims to facilitate 
evidence-based decision-making and to provide an update on important developments in 
the private copying law and practice of countries that have such an exception in their legal 
arsenals.” 
The survey highlights the instrumental role of private copying compensation in the 
remuneration of all rightsholders, including authors, publishers, performing artists, and 
producers. It informs also the users of copyrighted works, including manufacturers, 
importers and other stakeholders. It covers legal developments up until October 2015 and 
revenue data until 2014.  
Substantial differences between private copying systems remain across the world 
regarding, among others, tariff levels, scope of levy, liability of market players, methods 
of reporting, legal tools for monitoring and enforcement and methods of setting the tariff. 
Remuneration can be levied either on importers or manufacturers of recording devices, or 
be funded by the general resources of the State. Whatever the method chosen, the 
underlying idea is that levies for private copying be passed on to consumers, directly or 
indirectly. Levies on products are taken either as a percentage of the sales price or as a 
fixed amount. 
We learn that the European Commission aimed to harmonize the European private 
copying compensation systems in the early 1990s, but the harmonization did not 
materialize at this time. Instead, legal and practical developments went on separately with 
little cross-border considerations. This situation is even more acute on a worldwide basis.  
                                                          
1 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Stichting de Thuiskopie, International Survey on 
Private Copying, Law and Practice 2015. 
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The Berne Convention allows member states to introduce exceptions and limitations to the 
reproduction right “under the condition that fair compensation was paid to authors and other 
rightsholders for loss of revenues or harm caused to the rightholder whose work had been 
copied.” Due to the induced complexity of granting permission to large numbers of 
individuals and monitoring their subsequent use, the application of the reproduction right is 
limited within several jurisdictions to activities qualifying for “private copying”. 
An exception or limitation to the exclusive right, provided that rightsholders are fairly 
compensated, has generally been considered as the only efficient mechanism to 
remunerate creators for the widespread copying of their works for private or domestic use.  
Private copying refers to copy made by an individual specifically for one’s personal use, 
hence no commercial purpose. Levies on products used for copying were first introduced 
in Germany in 1966, thereby replacing the exclusive reproduction right with a right to 
equitable remuneration. In other jurisdictions, levies were bound to long-existing private 
copying exceptions, when it became clear that modern technological developments would 
exacerbate the effect of private copying on the income potential of rightsholders.  
Generally, the scope of the exception applies only to downloads coming from legal sources, 
i.e. sites and networks whereon music and films have been uploaded with the consent of 
rightsholders. “There are exceptions to this rule: Russia, Switzerland and Canada do not have 
a specific provision regarding the source of the copy, and thus all copies made for private use 
fall within the scope of the exception.”2  
With practical aspects of the implementation of levy systems clarified by several judgments of 
the CJEU, the debate now focuses on the notion of “harm”.  With the Case No. C-467/08, 
harm caused to authors of copyright work is the criterion on which the determination of the 
remuneration for rightsholders should be based, when introducing a private copying 
exception. A consensus still needs to be found on how to interpret the concept of harm: 
should it be considered as an economic loss due to the foregone licensing opportunities by the 
                                                          
2 In Europe, the 2015 judgement in Case No. C-435/12 of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) held that Directive 2001/29/EC (Copyright Directive) requires national legislation to make the 
distinction between the legality or illegality of the source from which a reproduction for private use is made. 
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rightsholders for the additional private copies, or as the value attached by consumers to the 
possibility of making private copies? 
Besides, according to the CJEU, the application of a levy for the financing of fair 
compensation with respect to digital reproduction equipment, devices and media must be 
linked to the deemed use of them for the purposes of private copying. The emergence of 
cloud storage possibilities and online licensed services (streaming models) brings 
additional complexity to set the scope of the private copying exception.  
The implementation of compensation systems 
Appling levies to the price of recording equipment or media sold to individuals for their 
private purpose appears to be the most feasible and efficient method for collecting 
compensation from individuals. For transparency purposes, the European Parliament 
furthermore proposed that the levy part be mentioned in the sales price to consumer.   
Depending on the jurisdiction, compensation systems can be levied on recording equipment 
and media, or exclusively on supports qualifying as “blank media”, as is the case in Canada. 
That said, it has become increasingly challenging to make a well-defined distinction between 
recording equipment and media, leading to different meanings given to covered devices: In 
France for example, as in other countries applying a media levy system, hard disks in 
equipment such as audio-visual recorders, set-top boxes and TV sets with integrated hard 
disks qualify as “blank media”. In some countries, memory units are subject to levy only 
when used and sold with a recording device, and not if the two are sold separately. 
Multifunctional devices, such as tablets and mobile phones, are progressively added to the 
scope of the levy. Cloud storage inducing a possibility of limitless copy and use of protected 
works, have brought additional difficulties to define the scope, level, and applicability of the 
levies.  
Depending on the country, tariff-setting models can take various forms, namely: State-funded 
systems with no tariffs (Spain, Finland…); Direct state intervention systems whereby tariffs, 
the scope of products subject to levy, and the private copying exception are determined by the 
legislator (Italy, Portugal, USA…); Negotiation systems between rightsholders (collecting 
societies administering the levies) and importers/manufacturers of consumer electronics and 
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the IT industry to determine tariffs (Germany, Austria…); A model in which tariffs are set by 
law after proposals by industries or negotiation stakeholders in special bodies appointed by 
the government (Belgium, Canada, France…). These special bodies serve as negotiation 
platforms, determine which products are subject to levy, and often advise the government for 
tariff-setting. Tariffs can either be set in the form of a fixed amount, or as a percentage 
applied on the sales or import price of the product.  
One can observe in the following Table that, compared to France or even Germany, the 
Canadian system applies a very limited fixed amount on the sales price of media types and 
devices for the remuneration of rightsholders, with 0.21€ on each blank CD sold, the only 
type of device which is subject to levy in the country. By contrast, for each Set-top box and 
External HDD sold in France, 45€ and 20€ respectively are dedicated to rightsholders’ 
compensation.   
Fixed tariff for standardized media types and devices (in €, 2015) 
(World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Stichting de Thuiskopie,  
International Survey on Private Copying, Law and Practice 2015.) 
 CANADA (€) FRANCE (€) GERMANY (€) 
CD (700 MB) 0.21 0.35 0.06 
DVD (4.7 GB) 0 0.90 0.27 
External HDD (1 TB) 0 20.00 17.00 
MP3 Player (8 TB) 0 12.00 5.00 
PC (500 GB) 0 0 13.19 
Set-top box (500 GB) 0 45.00 34.00 
Smartphone (16 GB) 0 8.00 36.00 
Tablet (16 GB) 0 8.40 15.19 
 
The collecting process of private copying remunerations is generally carried out by one 
collecting society appointed by the government or by rightsholders, a collecting society to 
which importers, manufacturers and other liable parties are required to report. Authors, 
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performing artist, and producers are represented on their board. In some instances (Czech 
Republic, Greece and the Slovak Republic), the collection is done through multiple societies 
representing specific groups of rightsholders. 
Levy revenues can either be allocated directly to rightsholders in the case of multiple 
collecting societies, or in stages in the case of a single collecting society, which then allocates 
funds to the distributing organizations representing the respective categories of rightsholders 
(authors/composers, producers, and performing artists).  
Distribution schemes are determined either by rightsholders’ organizations or by law or state 
intervention, or can be the result of negotiations between the different groups of rightsholders. 
Levy revenues are in general first divided amongst the different categories of copied work, 
such as audio, video, written works, and interactive works – this first step is usually done 
from the results of market research on the type of works copied on the various media – and 
then are distributed to the related rightsholders. 
Revenue collected for rightsholders tend to be highly volatile across national systems as well 
as over the years within a country.  
Levy Revenue Trends (in €) 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Stichting de Thuiskopie,  
International Survey on Private Copying, Law and Practice 2015 
(GNI: Gross National Income) 
 
2007 
a. Total M€ 
b. Per capita 
2014 
a. Total M€ 
b. Per capita 
VARIATION 
2007-2014  
(%) 
2014 
PER CAPITA 
PER €1M GNI 
CANADA 
a. 20.2 
b. 0.61 
a. 3.5 
b. 0.10 
-83% €2.54 
France 
a. 163.4 
b. 2.55 
a. 228.3 
b. 3.45 
+40% €106.22 
GERMANY 
a. 148.8 
b. 1.81 
a. 281.2 
b. 3.48 
+89% €96.81 
ITALY 
a. 71.0 
b. 1.21 
a. 78.0 
b. 1.27 
+10% €49.21 
SPAIN 
a. 40.7 
b. 0.90 
a. 5.0 
b. 0.11 
-88% €4.78 
US n/a 
a. 0.4 
b. 0.00 
n/a €0.03 
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In 2014, the German system is the most favorable one for the remuneration of rightsholders, 
in absolute terms with more than 280 million € levied, and in relative terms with 3.48 € of 
revenue per capita. Total revenue went up by 89% during the 2007-2014 period.. 
Canada experienced a significant decrease of 83% in the revenue recorded, from 20 million € 
in 2007 to 3.5 million € in 2014, the latter representing 0.10 € per capita. The Canadian 
Private Copying Collective can receive levies only on blank media (blank CDs).  
Due to unfavorable legal developments (see below), Spain also showed a major drop in 
revenue collected in the 2007-2014 period with an 88% decrease, going from 40 million € to 5 
million €. This represents only 0.11 € per capita.  
As for revenue collected relative to Gross National Income, France ranked first in 2014 in the 
above list3, with €106.22 collected per capita per million € of GNI, followed by Germany 
with €96.81. The US and Canada have by far the lowest levels of levies relative to GNI, with 
€0.03 and €2.54 respectively.     
Recent legal development in Europe and Canada 
UK.  
The UK introduced in October 2014 a private copying exception, whereby individuals were 
granted permission to make copies of content they owned, including storing them in the 
cloud. The transfer of copies from one individual to another could only be done on a private 
and temporary basis. The UK drafted exception did not stipulate any mechanism to 
compensate rightsholders. European law, by which the UK must abide, requires private 
copying exception be accompanied with compensation to rightsholders, except where harm to 
rightsholders is minimal. The UK government supposed for its draft a minimal impact on 
rightsholders, an argument which was then challenged in court by music organizations. They 
launched a judicial review of the UK government's decision to introduce a private copying 
exception. In July 2015, declaring the draft unlawful, the Court quashed the government’s 
decision. 
                                                          
3 Hungary actually leads with €279.16, France comes second in the overall study. 
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Spain.  
In the 2010 Padawan v SGAE case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held 
that indiscriminate application of the private copying levy to all types of digital reproduction 
equipment, devices and media, including situations in which such equipment were acquired 
for purposes clearly unrelated to private copying, was not compatible with the 2001 
Information Society (or “Copyright”) Directive.  
The CJEU wrote: “The concept of ‘fair compensation’, within the meaning of Article 5(2)(b) 
of Directive 2001/29/EC4 … on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society, must be regarded as an autonomous concept of European 
Union law which must be interpreted uniformly in all the Member States that have introduced 
a private copying exception, irrespective of the power conferred on the Member States to 
determine, within the limits imposed by European Union law in particular by that directive, 
the form, detailed arrangements for financing and collection, and the level of that fair 
compensation.” 
The CJEU added: “Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29/CE must be interpreted as meaning 
that the ‘fair balance’ between the persons concerned means that fair compensation must be 
calculated on the basis of the criterion of the harm caused to authors of protected works by the 
introduction of the private copying exception. It is consistent with the requirements of that 
‘fair balance’ to provide that persons who have digital reproduction equipment, devices and 
media and who on that basis, in law or in fact, make that equipment available to private users 
or provide them with copying services are the persons liable to finance the fair compensation, 
inasmuch as they are able to pass on to private users the actual burden of financing it.” 
And finally: “Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29/CE must be interpreted as meaning that a 
link is necessary between the application of the levy intended to finance fair compensation 
with respect to digital reproduction equipment, devices and media and the deemed use of 
                                                          
4 The article 5(2)(b) says: “Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right 
provided for in Article 2 in the following cases: in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural 
person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the 
rightsholders receive fair compensation which takes account of the application or non-application of 
technological measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject matter concerned.” 
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them for the purposes of private copying. Consequently, the indiscriminate application of the 
private copying levy, in particular with respect to digital reproduction equipment, devices and 
media not made available to private users and clearly reserved for uses other than private 
copying, is incompatible with Directive 2001/29/CE.” 
The Padawan decision represented a turning point in the EU private copying legislation, and 
lead to follow-up cases in many European countries as well as new court cases before the 
CJEU to clarify the ruling further. 
This case is a nice example of the sayings “the best is the enemy of the good” and “the road to 
Hell is paved with good intentions.” In trying to unreasonably fine tune the system (certainly 
a good intention), the Court may have imposed large losses on rightsholders. If the private 
copying regime had to charge the levy only on those buyers who confirm their intention to 
copy music, it is quite clear that almost nobody would say so and the private copying regime 
would fall apart. No policy implementation scheme is perfect in all respect and all schemes 
represent reasonable compromises between the precision with respect to the objectives and 
the cost of the implementation.  
In the EGEDA and Others v Administración del Estado and Others (2016) case, the CJEU 
was asked to rule on whether a system of fair compensation for private copying satisfy Article 
5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29/CE if the system, while being based on the estimated harm 
caused to rightsholders, is financed by the general government budget without ensuring that 
the cost of that compensation falls on the users of the private copying exception.  
The Court answered in the negative as follows (June 2016): “Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 
2001/29/EC … must be interpreted as precluding a scheme for fair compensation for private 
copying which, like the one at issue in the main proceedings, is financed from the General 
State Budget in such a way that it is not possible to ensure that the cost of that compensation 
is borne by the users of private copies.” 
Sweden.  
A Swedish Arbitration Board issued a judgment in the proceedings between Copyswede, the 
Swedish collecting society for private copying levies, and the Universal Media Alliance 
(UMA), October 24, 2012. The judgment stipulated that rightsholders are entitled to 
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compensation for private copying on external hard drives and USB flash drives. Copyswede 
and UMA have had different views on whether external hard drives and USB flash drives are 
associated with an obligation to pay compensation for private copying. Specifically the 
disagreement is about whether these products can be considered to be "particularly suitable" 
for private copying in the manner that is required for liability under the Swedish Copyright 
Act and the underlying EU Directive. In October 2011, following negotiations between 
Copyswede and UMA, the parties agreed to let an Arbitration Board determine the question 
whether there are legal grounds for remuneration on external hard drives and USB flash 
drives. The Board concluded that the products are covered by the current legislation and that 
compensation should be paid according to the Swedish Copyright Act. The remuneration is, 
in accordance with the agreement, 80 SEK (about 12 C$) per unit for external hard drives and 
1 SEK/GB (about C$0.15/GB) up to 80 GB USB flash drives with a storage capacity of more 
than 2 GB. 
Canada.  
In October 2012, the Canadian Government issued a regulation aimed to exclude microSD 
cards and similar cards from the definition of “audio recording medium” and therefore 
prevent the Copyright Board from setting a levy on such cards to compensate rightsholders 
for the private copying of music on those recording media and devices. The main and sole 
argument of the Government was that such a levy would “increase the costs to manufacturers 
and importers of these cards, resulting in these costs indirectly being passed on to retailers and 
consumers … thereby negatively impacting e-commerce businesses and Canada’s 
participation in the digital economy [sic!].”5  The Government added: “The objectives of 
these Regulations are to support the Government of Canada’s commitment to promoting a 
digital economy that encourages the development and early adoption of new technologies; 
and avoid an additional cost on the manufacture or importation of microSD cards, which are 
commonly used in smartphones and other technologies that drive the digital economy. 
The MicroSD Cards Exclusion Regulations (Copyright Act) exclude microSD cards (the 
                                                          
5 One wonders if the Minister convinced the cabinet of the necessity of exempting microSD card for fear of 
falling back to the Stone Age, as, he must have predicted, those countries where private copying levies exist on 
microSD cards (more precisely on devices incorporating such cards) will soon be strangers if not refugees in the 
emerging digital world! 
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technical standards of which are set by the SD Association) from the definition of ‘audio 
recording medium’ for the purposes of the private copying regime, meaning that no tariff can 
be certified for their importation or manufacture.” 
It would be challenging to find another regulation so confusedly, poorly and wrongly 
justified. One wonders why the cost of creators’ compensation is so directly targeted, while 
other more important costs, including capital costs, energy costs, labor costs, and 
government’s own taxes, incurred in manufacturing or importing microSD cards are not. This 
is tantamount to expropriating land without compensation in order to reduce the cost of 
developing the land! In business, the risk of a change in regulation, the regulatory risk, is part 
of the normal if not daily challenges faced by firms. But in copyright protection it is the 
individual creators and artists who are directly hit by this change in regulation.  
The Canadian Government claimed that its microSD card exclusion regulations imposed “no 
expected costs to the public, industry or copyright owners since the Regulations seek to 
maintain the current no-levy status of microSD cards.” Quite the contrary, the Regulations are 
at odds with the spirit and intent of the 1997 amendments to the Copyright Act that introduced 
an exception for private copying thereby making private copying legal, but with a promise of 
compensation of rightsholders. A change in copying technology made that compensation 
illusory (CPCC, the Canadian collecting society for private copying levies, collected some 40 
million C$ in 2004 but less than 4 million C$ today) as the old leviable supports are becoming 
obsolete and the new copying technologies and supports are declared exempt from levies. 
The competitive market value of and compensation for private copying 
As an explicit example of the way private copying is valued, let us consider the case of 
France, whose methodology is both quite explicit and more advanced if somewhat typical of 
what is done in many other jurisdictions.  
In France, the private copying system covers four different goods or fields: music or audio, 
films and other videos, still images or photographs, and printed material, books in particular. 
Each of them is covered by the private copying legislation and subject to compensation of 
creators or artists as rightsholders. My account of the methodology, agreements and dissents 
finds its source in documents from both rightsholders advocates and industry representatives. 
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A Commission is responsible for determining the mediums or supports subject to a levy and 
the rate or rates applicable to each medium. It is composed of 24 members (12 representatives 
of rightsholders, 6 industry representatives, and 6 representatives of consumers; it is chaired 
by a state representative. hence the composition of the Commission gives rightsholders a 
significant quasi control on its decisions even if balanced by the power of the Conseil d'État to 
overturn decisions that may appear unjustified.  
The private copying exception to copyright protection and enforcement call for proper 
compensation of rightsholders for the losses suffered as a result of the copyright-exempted 
copies being made. The Conseil d'État, the overall regulatory body supervising the private 
copying system, specified that compensation for private copying "must be set at a level 
capable of generating income … generally similar to what would be obtained from fees to be 
charge to each author of private copies if it were possible to establish and collect them.” The 
Conseil stated also that the Commission should base its decisions on studies of uses, not 
merely on assumptions or equivalences.  
The implementation of the rules laid down by the Conseil d'État therefore requires a multi-
step process: the determination on the basis of a study of uses the volume of relevant copies; 
the measurement of the compensation of rightsholders in the proxy sector; the determination, 
on the basis of the above elements, of the levy applicable to each medium (copy support). 
The Commission undertook studies by questionnaires on the private copying behavior of 
consumers to determine the volume of copies being made. The results made it possible to 
identify the copying behaviors, which are covered by the exception and which call for 
compensation, and those, which do not: copies made from illicit sources are not covered and 
were excluded, and copies made from legal downloading were also excluded. The studies 
reflected the practice of copying over a period of six months. 
The next step is the determination of compensation in the proxy sectors. The objective being 
to determine the rightsholders’ compensation for each particular use of their works in private 
copying, it was necessary to obtain an estimate of the compensation received for the 
commercial exploitation of their works. 
13 
 
In order to achieve this, the rightsholders proposed the following methodology to determine 
which proxy to use as indicative of the compensation to consider, that is, to estimate what 
compensation formula and rate for each of the four areas of interest. The methodology will 
turn out to be the main subject of dissent between rightsholders’ and industry representatives. 
The following are in a nutshell the propositions of rightsholders’ representatives: 
 For the audio repertoire, the proxy is a 4-minute musical title acquired as a download 
at a price of € 0.65 (excluding VAT) corresponding to an average of the higher price 
of a single title download and the lower price per unit of an album download. 
 For the video repertoire, the proxy suggested is the sale price € 18.60 corresponding to 
an average price of a film in classic DVD and Blu-ray and the price of a film for a 
family of 4 in a cinema. 
 For the repertoire of images, the proxy suggested is the average 0.42 € price of a 
digital image download on mobile phones. 
 For the repertoire of literary works, the proxy suggested is a 7 € price corresponding to 
an average selling price 10 € for a book available on traditional market reduced by 
30% to take into account the discount observed in the digital market compared to the 
traditional market.  
The following are the criticisms and propositions of industry representatives (AFNUM). In 
general, AFNUM proposed to take into consideration all possible equivalent licit experiences 
for each of the four sectors, not only the particular experiences suggested by the rightsholders’ 
representatives, which are arguably biased upward. When the suggested experience is not 
priced on a well-functioning market, it will be necessary to consider different factors that will 
lead to a comparison between the experience value enjoyed by a consumer’s consumption of a 
private copy and the experience value enjoyed by the consumer’s consumption of an original 
version whose value is known.   
 For the audio repertoire, AFNUM proposes to consider the following proxies: the 
listening to a musical content acquired as a legal download, the same audio content 
listened to in streaming, the same audio content listened to an radio, and the same 
audio content viewed from a legally acquired DVD/BR sold commercially. Each of 
these video experiences must be evaluated through its relevant market price data and 
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its relative usage value with respect to the private copy experience. For instance, if the 
original experience or usage value is twice the usage value of the private copy 
experience, then its proxy value or price would be cut by half. When all four adjusted 
proxy values are so obtained, the resulting private copying compensation proxy 
corresponds to the average of the adjusted proxies. 
 For the video repertoire, AFNUM proposes to consider the following proxies: the 
viewing of a video content acquired as a legal download, the same video content 
viewed on TV, the same video content viewed in a cinema, and the same video content 
viewed from a legally acquired DVD/BR sold commercially. Each of these video 
experiences must be evaluated through its relevant market price data and its relative 
usage value with respect to the private copy experience. For instance, if the original 
experience or usage value is twice the usage value of the private copy experience, then 
its proxy value or price would be cut by half. When all four adjusted proxy values are 
so obtained, the resulting private copying compensation proxy corresponds to the 
average of the adjusted proxies. 
 For the repertoire of images, a similar methodology would be applied. Details not yet 
known. 
 For the repertoire of literary works, a similar methodology would be applied. Details 
not yet known.  
The other steps are similar to those proposed by the rightsholders’ representatives. These 
involve the proper consideration of the rightsholders´ share in relevant commercial sectors, 
the 85% abatement based on the “fact” that the value for consumers of a private copy must be, 
should be, or is significantly lower than the value of the original first time access to or 
experience with a copyrighted work, and the translation of the resulting compensation rates 
into levies on recognized recording media and devices. This is done by taking into 
consideration the copying capacity of each medium or device and the private copying activity 
typical of each medium as measured on the basis of a survey covering the last 6 months of 
activity, which is then extended to two years, the expected average lifetime of the recording 
media. 
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For illustration purposes, here is how the rightsholders’ representatives’ proposals would 
proceed. Again, there is not much conflict on those subsequent steps, even if the starting point 
is significantly different.  
For the four repertoires, multiplying the proxy price by the rightsholders´ share in commercial 
sector leads to:  
 For audio, 0.65 € for a title of 4 minutes compensation extended to one-hour 
multiplied by 52.80% (the average shareholders’ share) gives an hourly compensation 
of € 5.15 for audio content copied.  
 For the video sector, 50% of € 18.60, or € 9.30, but reduced to one hour from one and 
a half hour movies, leads to a compensation of 6,20 € per hour of movie type content 
copying. In addition, a lower compensation of € 4.03 per hour was retained for non-
film video content (35% discount) copying.   
 For the still image, 0.42 € times 42%, or 0.176 € per fixed image copied.  
 In the case of literary work, € 7 times 40%, or € 2.80 per book copied. And compatible 
rates for other type of printed material copied (newspaper articles for instance).  
In the end, rightsholders’ representatives on the Private Copying Commission proposed those 
proxy compensation levels corresponding to what they earn in the respective commercial 
sectors used as proxy, namely 5,15 € per hour of audio, 6,20 € per hour of video, 0,176 € per 
fixed image and € 2.80 -per book.  
These values are then reduced by 85% to obtain the proposed compensations. Rightsholders 
representatives justified this reduction of 85% by stating that the value for consumers of a 
private copy must be significantly lower than the value of the original first time access to or 
experience with a copyrighted work in the context of commercial exploitation. This 
significant 85% abatement applied uniformly across all repertoires finds its origin in 2001 
negotiations within the Commission.  
Hence, the compensation received by rightsholders from the commercial use of their work, 
that is, between 40% and 52.8% of the public price (excluding taxes) depending on the 
repertoire considered minus an abatement of 85% across all repertoires, translates into a 
private copy compensation of 7% on average of the public price.  
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The private copy compensation as proposed by rightsholders’ representatives versus the 
compensation proposed industry representatives (AFNUM) are therefore:   
 € 0.773 per hour for music or € 0.0515 for a title of 4 minutes versus AFNUM 
proposal of a compensation of € 0.024 for the same title, which is slightly less than 
half (47%; or € 0.360 per hour) the compensation emerging from the rightsholders’ 
proposals.    
 € 0.93 per hour for a film (or a concert), hence € 1.40 for a 90-minute film (and € 0.60 
per hour for other types of audiovisual works, taking into account the "non-film" 
reduction of 35%), that is, € 0.04 for a 4-minute video clip) versus AFNUM proposal 
of a compensation of € 0.22 for a 90-minute film, which is less than 16% of the 
compensation emerging from the rightsholders’ proposals. 
 € 0.026 for a still image versus AFNUM proposal of a compensation that is still 
forthcoming. 
 0.42 € for a book (which is further modulated for the private copying of other types of 
text) versus AFNUM proposal of a compensation that is still forthcoming. 
The next step is to translate those compensations per hour or unit into compensation per 
medium, device, or support subject to a levy. This is done by taking into consideration the 
copying capacity of each medium and the private copying activity typical of each medium as 
measured on the basis of a survey covering the last 6 months of activity, which is then 
extended to two years, the expected average lifetime of the recording media.6 
For the audio repertoire, The Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) measured the average 
number of 4-minute music tracks copied on average for each medium. This volume of 
minutes would be expressed on an hourly basis and then multiplied by the above 
compensation rate of € 0.77 per hour (rightsholders’ proposal) versus € 0.360 per hour 
(AFNUM), that is, for the 6 month period covered amounts of 4.94 € versus 2.30 € for a MP4 
player, 1.94 € versus 0.90 € for a multimedia hard disk, 3.61 € versus 1.68 € for a multimedia 
                                                          
6 The current list of compensation level in euros for the different devices subject to a levy was published on 
December 14 2012 by the Commission and appeared in the Journal officiel de la République Française on 
December 26 2012. 
http://www.lexisnexis.fr/pdf/DO/Dxcision_du_14_dxcembre_2012_de_la_Commission_prxvue_x_lxarticle_L._
311-5_du_CPI.pdf    
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touch pad, 3.52 € versus 1.64 € for the MP3 player, etc. These amounts, obtained for a private 
copying practice over 6 months would be extended to 24 months (thus multiplied by 4) to 
obtain the levy to be applied to each medium or device: 19.76 € versus 9.21 € for a MP4 
player, 7.74 € versus 3.62 € for a multimedia hard disk, 14.44 € versus 6.73 € for a 
multimedia touch pad, 14.08 € versus 6.56 € for the MP3 player, etc. 
For the audiovisual repertoire, the number of eligible video files copied is multiplied by the 
average length of a video file (films, TV series, videos, documentaries, concerts and shows), 
which goes from 4 to 90 minutes depending on the type of content, then multiplied by the 
hourly compensation rate proposed for digital video, which as discussed above differs 
according to whether it is a movie or a concert or another video, each being brought to a one 
hour duration. 
For the repertoire of the still images, the reasoning is similar up to the difference that the 
calculation is done by picture and not per hour of content. By way of example, for the 
multimedia hard drive, CSA had calculated an average of 4.3 still images copied on average 
by users over a period of 6 months. By multiplying 4.3 frames by 0.026 € of RCP 
(rightsholders’ proposal; AFNUM proposal is forthcoming), we get 0.11 € of RCP to be 
collected on this support for the private copying of still images.  
As regards the repertory of literary works, the reasoning is similar as CSA measured copying 
practices for books, scores and song lyrics, full newspapers, and newspaper articles, all 
corrected to make it possible to compare the different types of copied content to a book. 
Again as measured by CSA over a period of 6 months.  
The final rate applicable to the different media or devices are abated for large-capacity media 
to take account of the fact that the quantity of copies made does not vary linearly with the 
copying capacity beyond a certain point, which depends on the medium considered. The final 
rate also take into account the level or weight of the compensation so obtained in the selling 
price of the media, in order to avoid price increases that would significantly affect the market 
demand for the media considered. Finally, a capacity cap is also considered for very large 
copying capacity media.   
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Comments  
Step 3a of the French procedure  
It is difficult not to support the AFNUM proposal to take into account all possible experiences 
that compare with the relevant private copying experience. It is likely to generate a more 
objective value by taking all relevant experiences that are priced in the commercial sectors.  
For audio proxies, AFNUM considers that music can be enjoyed from four different sources 
namely Hertzian radio, streaming (non-interactive simulcasting, semi-interactive, or 
interactive webcasting), downloads, and CDs. In each case, an estimate of the relative usage 
value per private copying audio unit (a 4-minute audio file) is obtained in four steps, First, a 
measure of commercial revenue per unit is obtained (revenue per listener per hour in Hertzian 
radio, revenue per play in streaming, average price of a title downloaded, average price per 
title on the CD market). Second, the share of rightsholders is the commercial value per unit 
(selling price) is obtained for the four sources. Third, the conversion factor between a private 
copying experience and the experience from the source considered is applied to obtain the 
private copying usage value for the source considered. Finally, an abatement factor of 85% is 
applied as representative of the secondary status of a private copy versus the original first time 
listening experience for each source. All proxy experiences are thus brought to comparable 
measures of usage value whose average provides the private copying usage value estimate we 
need. 
Similarly, for video proxies, AFNUM proposes to consider three sources of video experience 
for a 90-minute movie namely TV, DVD, and cinema. A procedure similar to the one 
followed for audio files is used to obtain the private copying usage value estimate we need. 
And so on for the other repertoires, still pictures and books or equivalents.  
Two factors of interest are the share of rightsholders in the commercial value or price, which 
is relatively high at an assumed 50% level, and the abatement level of 85% which at least for 
audio and still pictures may be too high a discount. The first factor is favorable to 
rightsholders but the second is not. It is not clear that the two effects balance one way or 
another. In fine, we get a combined effect on the private copy usage value of 
(X*EQV/15)*0.5*0.15 = (X*EQV/15)*0.075 where X is measured as the commercial 
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revenue per unit (for instance, in audio, the total radio revenue per listener-hour, one of four 
proxies) and EQV is the conversion factor of the private copy experience versus the original 
proxy experience (for instance, in audio, the relative value of listening to a 4-minute song as a 
private copy versus listening to it on radio, which is assumed to be the same, hence EQV = 1 
in this case), the product being divided by 15 to bring it from an hour basis to a 4-minute 
basis.  
The competitive market value of copyrighted works  
The main criticism one could make to the approach is that the competitive market value of 
music (a 4-minute audio file for instance in radio) need not correspond to the measure 
proposed on the basis of radio stations accounting data. The value is estimated at X*0.5/15 on 
the basis of the amount paid by the commercial radio industry to rightsholders (as mentioned 
above, the 50% factor is probably too high - it is about 6% in Canada - and it will be corrected 
once the real data are obtained from radio stations),  
But if such royalty payments to rightsholders are determined by regulation (administrative 
tribunal or commission) rather than on competitive markets, it may represent an under-
estimation of the competitive market value of music in Hertzian radio.  
In Boyer (2017b)7, I find that the royalty payments made by commercial Hertzian radio 
stations in Canada fall short of the competitive market value of music by a factor of 4.5, that 
is, payments total about C$ 100 million while the competitive market value is estimated, on 
the basis of operators’ choices and behavior, at C$ 450 million. For satellite radio, I find that 
the royalty payments made by US based SiriusXM fall short of the competitive market value 
of music by a factor of 2.8, that is, payments total about US$ 457 million while the 
competitive market value is estimated, on the basis of choices and behavior of SiriusXM 
operator, at US$ 1.2 billion. As for semi-interactive music streaming service Pandora, I find 
that the royalty payments made by the US based webcaster fall short of the competitive 
market value of music by a factor of 1.28, that is, payments total US$ 734.4 million (2016), 
                                                          
7 See Marcel Boyer (2017b), “The Three-Legged Stool of Music Value: Hertzian Radio, SiriusXM, Spotify”, August 31, a 
slightly revised version of https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/ChaireJJL/PolicyPapers/pp_the_three-
legged_stool_of_music_value_hertzian_radio_siriusxm_spotify_marcel_boyer_july_2017.pdf 
. 
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while the competitive market value is estimated, on the basis of Spotify interactive adjusted 
market-based per play rate, at US$ 936.7 million.  
All those royalty rates are regulated except for Spotify whose rates are primarily or mostly 
unregulated, hence market-based. If that is so also in France, then the revenue per listener-
hour on radio (one of the four proxies) would be biased downward.     
However, it would be non-efficient and non-optimal to charge commercial users and end 
consumers the competitive market value of the music they consume, in particular in 
private copying, given the information good character of musical works and sound 
recordings and the significant value generating properties of digital technologies in terms 
of lower cost of dissemination and customization. It is imperative that other 
complementary ways be found to compensate rightsholders for the competitive market 
value of their created works/assets.  
It might be useful to recall here that in the context of public policies towards educational 
services there is a clear separation between the pricing of services to end users, the 
students and their parents, and the compensation of educational services / content 
providers namely teachers and administrators and other personnel who are arguably 
compensated at their competitive market value.  
Similarly in public policies towards healthcare, there is a clear separation between what 
end consumers, the patients, pay and what the providers of healthcare services/content 
namely doctors, nurses, administrators and other personnel are receiving as compensation, 
which arguably correspond to their competitive market value. 
In Boyer (2017a)8 I suggest that one possibility to achieve the competitive market 
compensation of creators might be to bring all “beneficiaries” (primary users, ISP, 
equipment manufacturers, end consumers, and Governments) into one class or group of 
users and to make that group as a whole jointly and severally responsible for ensuring the 
proper competitive market compensation of creators. Those beneficiaries would be 
                                                          
8 Marcel Boyer (2017a), “The Competitive Market Value of Copyright in Music: A Digital Gordian Knot”, 
August 31, a slightly revised version of https://www.tse-
fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/ChaireJJL/PolicyPapers/pp_the_competitive_market_value_of_copyright
_in_music_a_digital_gordian_knot_marcel_boyer_july_2017.pdf 
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responsible for finding a sharing formula to determine their respective contributions to 
foot the bill. It is equivalent to considering a chain of stakeholders (users) between the 
creators and the end consumers of music, a complex endeavor. This chain of beneficiaries 
represents the Elephant in the room, alongside rightsholders and direct users. That is a 
difficult problem, never properly addressed before.  
The sought-after solution to this problem would involve the design of tariffs or 
contributions imposed at different stages of the value chain between creators and end 
consumers, hence on different beneficiaries of copyrighted musical assets, those 
beneficiaries being once again the direct users and ISP, equipment manufacturers, end 
consumers, as well as Governments as the collectives of end consumers. If indeed music 
fuels the Internet and is leading the digital transition, such a program is urgently needed. 
The 85% abatement  
The 85% abatement used to convert the original first time experience value per unit into a 
private copy value per unit is applied across all repertoires namely audio, video, still pictures, 
and printed material (books). Its origin dates back to 2001 negotiations among members of 
the Commission.  
Clearly, once one has read a book, say a novel, the value of a second private copy made for 
personal use and made from licit sources is certainly limited, given that one may not value 
highly the interest of having a second copy to be able to read the same novel once more if not 
repeatedly, say on the beach or during a trip. The value of a private copy in this case is mainly 
for backup or “insurance” reason, in case the original is lost. Even in this case, the loss 
incurred if the novel is lost may not be very high. The same goes on with movies and possibly 
but not so clearly with still pictures: once one has watched a movie or owns a still picture, 
getting a second copy may not carry high value.  
In these three cases, there is likely a big difference between the original first time experience 
value and the secondary private copy value: the abatement of 85% appears warranted. 
But in the case of music, the abatement may not be warranted. For audio files, the value may 
increase rather than decrease as the possibility of listening to a song is expanded. If making a 
private copy of a song allows one to listen to it more often, then the value of the copy may be 
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the same as the value of the original first time experience of listening to it say on an original 
CD. Music is a good subject to habit formation: the more you hear a good song, composition 
and lyrics, the more likely you are to enjoy it. People do like to hear repeatedly the same 
audio files; the immense success of interactive streaming services speaks very high for it. In 
such a case, no abatement would be warranted or at least a much smaller than 85% abatement 
would be more appropriate.    
A percentage is not a price 
Because of the challenging factors involved in pricing copyrighted works, percentages are 
often used for determining royalty payments. Expressing royalties as a percentage of an 
accounting base (e.g., revenues) serves different specific purposes such as allowing for (a) 
savings in transaction costs; (b) immunity to accounting manipulations if the base rate is well-
chosen and valid; and (c) risk-sharing between rightsholders and users. 
The methodologies proposed by rightsholders’ representatives and AFNUM are based on the 
expression of copyrights payments as percentages of some rate base. However, expressing 
royalty payments as a percentage of a rate base does not provide any indication about the 
price of copyrights. This follows because a percentage is not a price.  
There is no reason to believe that the proper price to be paid for the same inputs, namely the 
right to copy, would correspond to the same percentage of revenues irrespective of the 
characteristics of the underlying industries in question, because the same price for the same 
inputs used in two different industries will in general turn out to represent quite different 
percentages of the value of the industry outputs (revenues). 
The following example can help illustrate why a percentage is not a price. Suppose an 
apartment in a low income housing project is valued at $100,000. Suppose also an apartment 
of the same size and configuration in a high income housing project is valued at $1,000,000, 
i.e., ten times more. Suppose that the same quantity and quality of paint is used for both 
apartments. As expected, the cost of painting the two apartments would be the same as the 
law of one price applies to the input market (i.e., paint). Let us suppose that the actual cost of 
paint for the high value apartment is $1,000, i.e., 0.1 per cent of the value of the apartment. If 
one takes the 0.1 per cent as the “price” of the paint to be paid for the low value apartment, 
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one would get a price in dollar terms of 0.1 per cent x $100,000 = $100, or one-tenth of the 
cost of the same amount and quality of paint used. In fact, the cost of paint expressed as a 
percentage of the value of the two apartments would be quite different: 1.0 per cent for the 
low value apartment and 0.1 per cent for the high value apartment, a difference by a factor of 
ten for the same quantity and quality of paint. 
Applying this reasoning to the commercial radio and DPA industries, one is led to conclude 
that the same price for the same rights for the same repertoire of musical works and sound 
recordings, when expressed in percentage terms, will represent a much higher percentage in 
lower value added industries, where the main input is music such as in online music services 
(webcasting, music downloads), than in the higher value added industries, where musical 
works and sound recordings are one input among many such as radio. In other words, the 
same price would yield very different percentages.  
Conclusion 
Confronted with an increasing use of their copyrighted works in a globalized and digital 
context, rightsholders are struggling to protect their copyrights, which should allow them to 
capture a fair (competitive) share of the value their created works or assets generate. The main 
copyright challenge today is to adapt copyright law and practice to the digital age. These 
adaptations are done differently and unequally across jurisdictions and debates about the 
regulations, the scope of the exceptions - including fair dealing/use and private copying -, and 
the means of securing fair compensation for rightsholders are still ongoing.  
Nevertheless, levy systems tend to adapt to new technology and new devices in many 
countries, in France and Germany for instance, but not in others, for instance in Canada where 
the compensation for private copying is restricted to copies made on blank CDs, a copying 
technology that is disappearing at a fast rate. Restricting leviable media to blank CDs is a 
negation of the social contract granting the copyright exception for private copying in 
exchange for a promise to ensure fair compensation for rightsholders.     
There is an intentional willingness to compensate rightsholders for private copying, whose 
exclusive rights have been narrowed by the private copying laws and regulations. Total 
worldwide revenues from private copying levy systems increased from 598 million € in 2007 
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to more than 804 million € in 2014.9 However, levies tend to present a high degree of 
disparity and volatility. And as shown in the WIPO survey, EU countries are by far the largest 
contributors in the global private copying compensation, representing a stable 92% of total 
compensation over the years.  In this field, the US and Canada noticeably lag behind. 
                                                          
9 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Stichting de Thuiskopie, International Survey on 
Private Copying, Law and Practice 2015.  
